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Planning for Waterway Renewal: balancing between Institutional 
Reproduction and Institutional Change 
Modern waterway networks are ageing and need to be renewed, yet the 
institutional context in the waterway sector is averse to change because of path 
dependencies. Waterway renewal requires actors to navigate between 
institutional reproduction and change. Applying an innovative framework for 
analysing institutions in a case study of the Dutch national waterways, we mainly 
find instances of institutional reproduction, which turns waterway renewal into a 
technical and financial exercise. However, institutional change becomes 
increasingly evident through a new functional-relational path, suggesting that 
planning for waterway renewal also entails reconsidering novel waterway 
configurations and incorporating neighbouring spatial developments. 
Keywords: institutional change; waterways; institutions; path dependency; 
infrastructure planning; public administration. 
Introduction 
Modern waterway networks in the western world are rapidly ageing. Major components 
of these systems, such as weirs, bridges, and navigation locks, have reached or are 
currently reaching a state of maturity (and partial decline). This development marks a 
clear need to renew and renovate them (EIB, 2016; Gil & Beckman, 2009; Van Dorsser, 
2015). In addition to the technical and climate change-related challenges related to 
deteriorating waterway infrastructure, societal demands may also have altered 
considerably since the initial date of construction. Renewal of waterway networks is 
therefore presented as a change imperative for organisations responsible for 
infrastructure planning: the focus shifts from developing to redeveloping networks 
(Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Graham & Thrift, 2007; Kanter, 2015). However, previous 
research has demonstrated how the costs embedded in waterway infrastructure and 
institutions have created a context that is rigid and inert to change (Banister, Anderton, 
Bonilla, Givoni, & Schwanen, 2011; Farrelly & Brown, 2011). This context may, in 
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turn, create a situation in which both the physical infrastructure and the social 
institutions become ‘locked in’ in past configurations that do not take current and future 
conditions, such as changing societal demands, decreasing public funding, and climate-
related water stresses, into account (Willems, Busscher, Hijdra, & Arts, 2016). 
In order to anticipate and address a change imperative such as major waterway 
renewal, the central concern for planning research and practice is the organisation of 
collective action (see Alexander, 2005). This organisation is conditioned by institutions, 
since they operate as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction” (North, 1991, p. 97). Institutions can be both formal (laws, 
regulations) and informal (social conventions, norms). At the same time, institutions are 
the outcome of the organisation of collective action (cf. Giddens, 1984). As Mahoney 
and Thelen (2009, p. 4) argue, institutions are often treated as enduring features that are 
resistant to change. Accordingly, institutions are inherently conservative and self-
reinforcing: this characteristic is their strength, yet also their weakness (Gupta et al., 
2010). Hence, institutions embody an interesting paradox: whereas institutions are 
typically regarded as entities bringing predictability and stability, anticipating change 
and dynamism might put these entities under pressure. Indeed, change imperatives as 
waterway renewal may well call for ambiguity, change and dynamism – elements that 
can be far from predictable and stable. In the light of the anticipated waterway renewal, 
we have noted a research gap with regard to the agency of actors to bring about 
institutional change. 
Emphasising the agency of actors in institutional theories at critical moments in 
time (Sorensen, 2010; Salet, 2018) enables us to analyse how and why institutional 
change is initiated. From this perspective, actors are said to have the ability to enhance 
both processes of institutional reproduction, i.e. exploiting existing practices, and 
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processes of institutional change, i.e. exploring new practices (Mahoney, 2000; March, 
1991). So, we aim to understand how actors perceive the change imperative of 
waterway renewal and which institutional change actors find feasible. To analyse 
institutional change in waterway planning, we focus on agency and institutional 
dynamics from two key streams of institutionalism (new institutional economics and 
socio-constructionist institutionalism). We will analyse institutional change in the 
context of the highly mature Dutch inland waterway network which is undergoing a 
major transformation. The Netherlands has proven itself to be forward-looking 
regarding waterway planning (OECD, 2014) and its institutional setting is well-
established and well-documented (Arts, Filarski, Jeekel, & Toussaint, 2016; Lintsen, 
2002). Consequently, the Dutch waterway management system presents a perfect case 
for exploring processes of institutional change in regard to waterway renewal. 
The structure of this article is as follows. The second section offers a dynamic, 
actor-centred perspective on institutions, based on the notion of path dependency. This 
theoretical section works towards a framework for assessing actors’ motivations for 
institutional reproduction and change from two institutional perspectives. The third 
section discusses the methodology and introduces the case study of the Dutch national 
inland waterway network. Fourth, the findings from both institutional perspectives in 
our case study are presented with their implications for waterway renewal. The final 
section consists of the conclusions and discussion. 
Theoretical Framework 
A dynamic Perspective on Institutions: Path Dependency 
Institutions condition actors in responding either positively or negatively to change 
imperatives (Gupta et al., 2010). Actors can ignore the change and discard it as 
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irrelevant, or they can incorporate the change, which will set a process of institutional 
change in motion. In general, institutions typically hinder anticipating change, because 
they are often regarded as stable fixtures structuring interactions between individuals, 
groups and organisations through self-reinforcing mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). The self-reinforcing nature of institutions is stressed 
in the concept of path dependency. According to Sorensen (2015, p. 21), “[t]he core 
idea of ‘path dependence’ is that, once established, some institutions tend to become 
increasingly difficult to change over time, and so small choices early on can have 
significant long-term impacts”. Originally, the concept of path dependency was applied 
to explain ‘lock-ins’ in technical systems (Arthur, 1994; Unruh, 2000); currently, the 
concept is also widely applied to the social sciences (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000) 
including the field of planning (Bertolini, 2007; Sorensen, 2015). 
Path dependency does not imply that institutions are fixed or that rigidity is the 
sole potential outcome. Rather, path dependency implies that changes are structured by 
conditions (Sorensen, 2015). Actors can either follow or challenge established paths, 
leading to either a mechanism of institutional reproduction or a mechanism of 
institutional change (figure 1; Mahoney, 2000). In line with March (1991), both 
mechanisms are essential for institutions to cope change, which is a complicated 
balancing act. Tensions may indeed emerge easily between elements that aim to bring 
stability and those that look for experiment and novelty. Thus, actors will have to be 
able to navigate between reproduction and change. 
This ability becomes even more important at critical junctures. In the 
development of infrastructure networks, a phase of renewal can be considered such a 
juncture, which marks the need for re-considering the functionality of the system 
(Bolton & Foxon, 2015). According to Sorensen (2010, p.281), critical junctures are 
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“exceptional times when agency can play a much larger role in challenging existing 
institutions and establishing new policies that may in time become institutionalized”. 
Hence, pursuing either institutional reproduction or institutional change at these 
moments in time will have profound implications for the future of the infrastructure 
network. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
Different path-dependent Explanations from New Institutional 
Economics and Socio-Constructionist Institutionalism 
If we want to analyse the tensions that arise from actors pursuing either institutional 
reproduction or change, we need to further conceptualise how institutions are enacted 
by actors in practice (Healey, 2007; Salet, 2018). Under the umbrella term of new 
institutionalism, multiple conceptualisations for institutions as well as methodologies 
for researching institutions have been proposed (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Moreover, the 
new institutionalism can be witnessed more and more in planning research (Kim, 2011; 
Verma, 2007). 
Following DiMaggio (1998, p. 620), two major streams of institutionalism can 
be distinguished on the basis of their theoretical orientation: a lens rooted in new 
institutional economics (NIE), and a lens rooted in social-constructionist 
institutionalism (SCN) (for similar distinctions, see Buitelaar, Lagendijk, & Jacobs, 
2007; González & Healey, 2005; Inderberg, 2011). Although both have different 
theoretical (ontological) orientations, their origins are rather similar. On the one hand, 
both lenses argue that institutions operate in human interactions as both an enable and 
constraining factor (Salet, 2018). On the other hand, both lenses treat institutions as 
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endogenous factors that can actively be created and re-created by actors (Kim, 2011). 
Both NIE and SCN have developed distinct research traditions to analyse agency and 
institutional dynamics, in which the mechanisms of reproduction and change are 
differently operationalised (Mahoney, 2000). NIE presumes that institutions are inter-
organisational arrangements, which actors will re-create if that is in their self-interest 
based on voluntary rational choice. In contrast, SCN considers institutions as cultural 
signifiers to which (groups of) actors can relate; actors will re-create institutions if they 
are considered inappropriate. Table 1 provides an overview of the two different 
perspectives on institutional change. Linking the two perspectives offers a 
complementary account of institutions, considering the logic of both instrumentality and 
appropriateness (Buitelaar et al., 2007). The NIE-lens predominantly considers how 
actors rationally seek for efficient formal organisational arrangements, while the SCN-
lens complements these findings with actors looking for appropriate, often more 
informal types of institutions. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
New Institutional Economics: a Logic of Instrumentality 
The lens rooted in NIE presumes that the interactions between organisations to 
anticipate waterway renewal come with extra costs in addition to the actual production 
costs (Williamson, 1998): organisations will have to invest in each other, for instance, 
to get to know each other and reach agreement. NIE assumes that organisations will 
have an internal drive to lower their transaction costs. In theory, over time, more 
efficient transactions will arise, as organisations are expected to act rationally and to 
seek utility maximisation (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Williamson, 1999). The transactions 
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are governed by a system of organisational arrangements (Williamson, 1998). These 
arrangements can be regarded as “a means to an end” that contribute to the attainment 
of organisations’ sets of objectives in an efficient manner (Inderberg, 2011, p. 305). 
Clearly defined rights of ownership are expected to result in an improved inter-
organisational coordination and distribution of responsibilities, with corresponding 
lower transaction costs. Consequently, the new institutional economics follows a logic 
of instrumentality to smoothen exchanges between organisations. From this perspective, 
planning can be seen in terms of individuals voluntarily making joint decisions. To 
smoothen their transactions, individuals establish organisational arrangements, which, 
in the extreme, may result in either hierarchical organisations (through internalising 
activities) or a free market system (Alexander, 2001). 
From this perspective of voluntary choice, organisations will continuously 
consider their transaction costs to improve efficiency. A key assumption is that as long 
as the costs in the current arrangements do not outweigh the costs in alternative 
arrangements, current organisational structures will be reproduced. Only when it is no 
longer in the interest of organisations to maintain the established arrangements will 
institutional change occur. Such a change is driven by a different cost-benefit trade-off, 
derived from the evaluation of institutional performance (Mahoney, 2000), in our case 
ensuring a well-functioning waterway system. However, organisations tend to focus on 
the here and now and therefore neglect the long run and the bigger picture (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). Consequently, following Williamson (1999, p. 1105), transaction cost 
economics assumes that “previously unrecognised regularities” will be detected by 
organisations along the way as these patterns affect organisational performance. These 
considerations will subsequently lead to instrumental improvements in organisational 
arrangements that will lower the transaction costs. 
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Socio-Constructionist Institutionalism: a Logic of Appropriateness 
The lens rooted in SCN is a cultural approach that examines “the socially embedded 
process of institutionalisation” highlighting dialogue over decisions (Buitelaar et al., 
2007, p. 895). From this viewpoint, institutions are not instruments for achieving certain 
goals more efficiently, but rather operate as frameworks of meaning. Institutions thus 
serve a logic of social appropriateness, instead of a logic of instrumentality (March & 
Olsen, 1989). The logic of appropriateness is expressed through shared belief systems 
and practices, demonstrating that the ‘rules of the game’ are embedded in a wider 
culture (Hall & Taylor, 1996). To get a grip on the shared belief systems, discursive 
approaches in which language plays a central role are often used (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Organisations jointly construct meaning, thus 
determining the appropriate actions. This meaning-making process results in discourses 
that allocate meaning to social and physical phenomena which are reflected in a set of 
practices (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Dominant discourses condition the interactions 
between organisations through a logic of appropriateness. As a result, planners have 
become aware of how the wider historical-institutional context (for example visible in 
public norms) conditions specific planning practices (González & Healey, 2005). 
As previous research has shown, organisations have a tendency to comply with 
established discourses, which process has been referred to as institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 348) argue that this 
compliance demonstrates how organisations legitimatise their existence by adhering to 
societal values that define what is considered appropriate. This inclination operates as a 
strong driver for the mechanism of reproduction (Mahoney, 2000). Discrepancies 
between prevailing belief systems may challenge the dominant institutions, which 
subsequently could set institutional change in motion. Such discrepancies can arise out 
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of actors’ changing belief systems, expressing different central concepts. Ultimately, 
these changes may result in the breakdown of one discourse and its replacement with 
another. Planning research, however, has mainly shown instances of more incremental 
institutional change, in which institutions adapt more slowly to new circumstances 
(Healey, 1998). 
A Synthesis 
Table 2 summarises the two lenses and their perspective on institutional reproduction 
and change. In both strands, the mechanisms of change are driven by agents: 
institutional change is affected by either new organisational trade-offs or changes in 
organisations’ belief systems (Mahoney, 2000). To conclude, the framework presented 
in table 2 helps to understand the motivations why and how either institutional 
reproduction or change is favoured by actors. 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
Methodology 
Both institutional strands focus on the agency of organisations to modify established 
institutions. As a consequence, in our analysis, we will highlight how actors from key 
organisations approach waterway renewal and to what extent they perceive current 
institutions as both instrumental and appropriate. Waterway renewal is defined as a 
critical juncture (see figure 1) which makes this moment in time a suitable opportunity 
for reflecting whether established institutions still suffice. Our analysis allows us to 
identify mechanisms of reproduction and change from two lenses (table 2). We have 
examined this in the context of a case study of the Dutch inland waterway network, 
which will be introduced first. 
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Introduction to the Case Study 
The Dutch national inland waterway network is among the oldest transportation 
networks in the Netherlands. Many components, such as weirs, locks and bridges, have 
been built in the 1920s and 1930s (Van Dorsser, 2015). Moreover, a review of academic 
literature on the case study (Arts et al., 2016; Lintsen, 2002; Van den Brink, 2009) 
shows the path-dependent nature of the Dutch waterway network, due to a firmly 
established institutional setting. 
This established setting dates back to the Napoleonic era (late 18th century). 
Originating from that time, the Dutch Constitution defines making the land suited for 
human habitation and to protect and improve the living environment as the state’s 
responsibility. Providing infrastructure is therefore considered a public task in the 
Netherlands. To illustrate, the Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment yearly 
spends approximately 2.5% of the Dutch GDP on infrastructure development, 
management and operation (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). As a result, institutions 
developed in which the national government has the right of ownership to develop 
infrastructure. For instance, the centrally-led Rijkswaterstaat agency was founded in 
1798 to develop and operate the waterways across the Netherlands. Currently, 
Rijkswaterstaat is the executive arm of the national Ministry of Infrastructure & the 
Environment. Together they are the main parties responsible for the national waterways. 
Due to decreasing public funding, the national government is in search for co-financing 
arrangements with regional and local governments. For infrastructure investments, there 
are strict legal procedures that ensure consultation with regional and local stakeholders 
(see Arts et al., 2016). This consultation was typified by the OECD (2014, p. 17) as “a 
distinctive ‘polder approach’, which values concerted, consensus-based decision-
making”. The national government has traditionally been the most powerful national 
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actor in waterway development, exerting full control. This is symbolised in the central 
role of Rijkswaterstaat in the formation of the Netherlands (Lintsen, 2002), which has 
created a discourse that values technical expertise and made waterway management 
mainly an affair for engineers (Arts et al., 2016; Van den Brink, 2009). More recently, 
with the integration of new functions such as ecology and recreation (related to the 
Integrated Water Resources Management), the national government has been 
repositioned as an initiating or facilitating actor leaving more room for other parties to 
pursue their waterway-related interests (Hijdra, Arts, & Woltjer, 2014). These other 
parties are primarily public bodies, such as regional and local governments, but may 
also be private parties (e.g. container terminals, surrounding land-use owners, farmers). 
Despite the emergence of new institutions, the established institutional setting remains 
dominant. To illustrate, the Dutch national Council for the Environment and 
Infrastructure recently concluded that a sectoral way of working, occupied with 
realising new transport capacity, still prevails in Dutch planning practice (Council for 
the Environment and Infrastructure, 2018). 
The current waterway network is ageing and requires major upgrades 
(Deltaprogramma, 2012; Van Dorsser, 2015; EIB, 2016). For instance, 52 out of 137 
navigation locks require renewal before 2040 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2015). The rise in ageing 
assets has prompted a search for new ways of working that will guarantee a well-
functioning system in which the organisations involved may have new roles to play 
(Van der Vlist, Roovers, & Barneveld, 2016). In our study, this search is regarded as an 
excellent opportunity for actors to reflect critically on the established institutions: 
according to the organisations involved, do current institutions suffice for a context of 
waterway renewal? And if not, how should the institutions be altered following the 
logics of instrumentality and appropriateness? 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
In order to examine which institutional change actors believe is required for waterway 
renewal in the Dutch national waterways, 23 interviews were conducted in two rounds 
with senior officials working for key organisations in the waterways, such as the 
Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment, its executive agency Rijkswaterstaat, 
regional governments (provinces), the logistic sector and port authorities, knowledge 
institutes, consultancies and construction companies (see appendix 1). Each interview 
consisted of a reflection on current practices and interactions in concrete waterway 
examples and projects in order to reveal existing institutions and a discussion on 
(required) changes in these practices. All interviews were audio-recorded and 
transcribed. Summaries were sent to the interviewees for confirmation. 
The interview transcripts served as the basis for the explication of the 
established institutions and for the proposals for modification of these institutions. The 
qualitative data computer programme Atlas.ti was used to code the transcripts. All 
interviews were coded twice: first from a NIE-perspective; then from a SCN-
perspective. Concerning NIE, the right of ownership is a defining concept (e.g. the right 
to use or modify the waterway), which can be seen in the legal responsibilities 
(mandates) and financial structures. To operationalise SCN, the shared belief system 
and practices were further divided according to content (what are the key values and 
practices in the culture?), roles (which roles do the parties have to play and why?) and 
argumentation (is the culture based on coherent and consistent reasoning?) (Fisher, 
1992). As such, the coding process started with a deductively constructed code tree with 
two families of institutional structures and cultures. 
We defined actors’ views on the institutions at two moments in time (figure 1). 
As we were examining a highly advanced institutional setting, the established 
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institutions according to actors were taken as the initial conditions (t=1 in figure 1). 
Waterway renewal is operationalised as the critical juncture (t=2), at which moment 
actors will assess whether institutions can still be considered instrumental and 
appropriate (table 2). This assessment may trigger both institutional reproduction and 
institutional change (t=3). Institutional reproduction is considered in a continuation of 
rights of ownership and dominant discourses, institutional change in proposed changes 
in rights and discourses. In the end, our findings will show whether institutional 
reproduction, institutional change or both will take place.  
Actors’ Views on Institutional Change for Renewal in the Dutch 
National Inland Waterways 
This section presents the empirical findings regarding actors’ views on institutional 
reproduction and institutional change in the Dutch national inland waterways triggered 
by the topic of waterway renewal. The following sub-sections discuss the findings from 
the NIE-lens (in which actors are driven by a logic of instrumentality) and the SCN-lens 
(in which actors are driven by a logic of appropriateness) respectively (summarised in 
table 3 at the end of this section). 
Actors Views’ on instrumental Institutions 
Initial Conditions: current Institutions  
As all interviewees confirmed, providing infrastructure is considered a public task in the 
Netherlands. For instance, as interviewee #3 from the logistics sector puts it, the 
national government has a duty to cater for smooth inland navigation and water safety. 
Consequently, the national government, more specifically the Ministry of Infrastructure 
& the Environment (responsible for policy-making) and its executive agency 
Rijkswaterstaat (for the day-to-day operation), has the right of ownership. The right of 
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ownership is reflected in the responsibilities of the national government to safeguard the 
primary aims of the waterways, i.e. ensuring waterborne transportation and 
guaranteeing water discharge for water safety purposes. Interviewees state that the 
national government’s overarching objective with regard to the waterways is 
maintaining a system that does not fail these tasks. As interviewee #9 argues, 
“[maintaining an advanced system] is quite a challenge in itself”. Although the 
national government has full control, the Ministry is obliged to consult with regional 
and local parties on investments in the waterways. Other parties intend to use or modify 
the waterways rely on the national government, as the Ministry has to approve their 
plans. 
The existing institutions (t=1 in figure 1), developed to secure current waterway 
performance to maximise utility, can be typified as formal and hierarchical, with clear 
responsibilities for each party (captured in legal and financial agreements). Every year, 
the Ministry approves the national infrastructure budgets, which are derived from the 
national Infrastructure Fund (for transportation such as highways and waterways) and 
Delta Fund (for the national water system) (see also Arts et al., 2016). These funds run 
until 2030, with allocated budgets for infrastructure construction and maintenance. 
According to interviewee #5, who works for the Ministry, the construction budget is 
expected to resolve the major bottlenecks in the transportation systems before 2030, 
based on current scenarios. In addition, there are funds for maintenance and operation, 
which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat uses to ensure a smooth operation of the 
transportation system. This budget category includes renewal and renovation (I&M, 
2017). 
As a consequence, waterway renewal has been operationalised as primarily a 
task for the infrastructure operator. Between the strategically-operating Ministry and its 
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implementer Rijkswaterstaat, organisational arrangements have been established to 
streamline the funds allocated. Over time, the responsibilities and exchanges have been 
formalised and institutionalised. As a result, the transaction costs are perceived as 
relatively low by interviewees #5 and #14, as both parties know each other well and the 
aims are clear. As considerable budgets are involved, accountability to parliament is 
important. The whole process is streamlined in strict procedures that prescribe 
responsibilities and budget allocations between the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat. Given 
that Rijkswaterstaat as the operator has more hands-on knowledge, the Ministry tries to 
overcome information asymmetries, for instance by commissioning Rijkswaterstaat to 
deliver an overview of the technical state of the waterway network to the Ministry every 
two years. The executive agency underscores that renewal is mainly a technical 
exercise. Interviewees argue that the need for consultation with other parties is limited, 
since renewal often does not lead to altered or new functionalities. A Rijkswaterstaat 
employee (interviewee #13) specifies that: 
“In the national inland waterway system, you will find all types of infrastructure 
assets which reach their technical end-of-life-cycle. We just ask [the Ministry] for 
money to replace those assets with new ones. That is the common procedure, 
which remains within the technical domain.” 
To conclude, the NIE-lens reveals that actors perceive institutions focusing on 
the budget and technical issues as instrumental. Consequently, the organisational 
arrangements centre on the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat and do not have much political 
influence, so transaction costs are perceived as low. 
Critical Juncture: instrumental Institutions for Renewal 
For waterway renewal (t=2 in figure 1), the public task of providing infrastructure is not 
put into question. Interviewees argue that, if the infrastructure starts deteriorating, the 
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national government has a responsibility to continue (or even upgrade) current 
performance levels. The right of ownership remains therefore unaffected. The growing 
importance of waterway renewal incited Rijkswaterstaat to start several exploratory 
studies. These studies, amongst others, can be considered a reflection on existing 
institutions and have led to new insights and demands on how to approach renewal.  
The project Renewal Challenge Hydraulic Works (in Dutch: Vervangingsopgave 
Natte Kunstwerken) and an exploratory study on the Meuse river (Grip op de Maas) 
have raised the awareness that replacing waterway assets on a one-to-one basis might 
lead to a ‘lock-in’ of the current waterway system with dated functionalities. As a 
Rijkswaterstaat interviewee (#20) argues, replacing assets one by one “implies that (…) 
the [waterway] system configuration will also function for the long term, that it is 
durable.” Interviewees involved in the studies became aware that waterway renewal is 
not necessarily purely related to maintenance. As interviewee #13 illustrates with an 
example: 
“[The asset] is part of a waterway system, which has been designed for [specific 
purposes]. By now, these purposes have changed. So you want to replace [an asset] 
for a dated objective… Don’t we need to take a closer look? Well, that was not 
commonplace.” 
This quote demonstrates that there may exist a variety of alternatives for 
renewing waterway assets besides just replacing them. As a result, renewal discussions 
obtain a political dimension, in which existing functionalities are questioned. In 
addition, functionalities such as recreation, energy generation, and ecological issues are 
increasingly incorporated into waterway planning as well. Waterway renewal is no 
longer only the operator Rijkswaterstaat’s responsibility, but other parties are getting 
involved too. Thus, actors put the instrumentality of current institutions into question, 
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which marks a shift from technical, hierarchal organisational arrangements towards 
more functional, relational arrangements. 
Interviewees propose several modifications of established institutions to move 
away from an arrangement in which the Ministry and Rijkswaterstaat take the lead. The 
first modification relates to the funding source. At the moment, the Infrastructure and 
Delta Fund only provide funding for one-to-one renewal from the maintenance budget 
(figure 2). For additional functionalities, new funding sources should be found. 
Interviewee #4 from the Ministry indicates that the Ministry has gained quite some 
experience co-financing water system projects with fellow public governments, for 
instance in the national Delta Programme (Deltaprogramma) and the Flood Protection 
Programme (Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma) in which national and regional 
governments co-operate. A similar approach is taken in the transportation sector, in 
which the national programming, planning and budgeting (PPB) framework of key 
Dutch national infrastructure projects is followed. This framework encompasses the 
Multi-Year Programme for Infrastructure, Land Use and Transport 
(Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport) and translates strategic 
transportation policies into specific national projects. The PPB-framework extensively 
describes the rules of the game for national and regional parties to negotiate and decide 
upon either the construction of new infrastructure or the renewal of existing 
infrastructure (see Arts et al., 2016). 
 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
 
Positioning waterway renewal in the national programming, planning and 
budgeting framework creates a new institutional setting, in which the Ministry (and its 
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executive agency, Rijkswaterstaat) is no longer the only responsible player. 
Transactions between mainly public governments become the core focus. The Ministry 
has declared that it is willing to discuss regional initiatives, as interviewee #4 
demonstrates: “You can link [your ambitions to ours] and participate. But if you want 
to join, you’ll have to contribute financially, too.” Even so, these discussions take place 
within certain boundaries (rights of ownership), as national interests can overrule 
regional ambitions: “If you want to arm wrestle, you should not do that with us of 
course.” (interviewee #4) Some provinces, although not all (yet), see an opportunity to 
connect regional ambitions with national renewal projects. As interviewee #8 from a 
province explains, “If you have ambitions [as a province], you have to take your 
responsibility. And in financial terms, too.” Both quotes illustrate that discussions can 
easily become a financial matter (figure 2). Although the Ministry argues that other 
parties had better just join this new ‘game’, regional parties feel that the sectoral 
(transportation) angle is still dominant, since the Ministry is tied to fixed budgets and 
can overrule regional parties. The Ministry confirms: “Only when there are great ideas 
[from regional parties] can we explore whether we can expand our budget. It does not 
work the other way around.” (interviewee #4) Moreover, the new arrangements 
currently still operate in a rather informal way and, according to interviewee #10, are 
highly reliant on regional political ambitions. As a consequence, arrangements become 
more open, yet also appear more ad hoc. 
In these new, more political arrangements, Rijkswaterstaat has difficulty 
defining its responsibility. Interviewees from Rijkswaterstaat perceive themselves as 
operators who can put issues on the agenda of the Ministry. A consultant (interviewee 
#1) observes that Rijkswaterstaat likes to attend negotiations within the national PPB-
framework as a neutral party (the operator as the expert that other parties can consult 
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with), but regional governments especially consider Rijkswaterstaat a representative of 
the Ministry. As interviewee #16 from Rijkswaterstaat confirms, “We are not 
independent.” Being one of the parties at the table, Rijkswaterstaat is also less familiar 
with combining its own interests with those of the others, as the agency considers its 
own interests of higher national importance. For example, interviewee #12 argues 
“[Rijkswaterstaat] should not all of a sudden allow activities that may harm how our 
waterway network currently functions. You have to be very alert in that respect, (…) or 
else you’ll devaluate your own system.”  
Regional and local governments gain more responsibilities and are often 
represented by the Dutch provinces. Whereas some provinces are very active in 
connecting waterway developments with regional economic development (e.g. 
Overijssel, Noord-Brabant), others are more hesitant or even unaware of the 
possibilities. The latter group of provinces (e.g. interviewee #7) argues that the Ministry 
should initiate waterway (re-)development programmes which regions can join later. 
However, the Ministry is taking a similar perspective in waiting for regional initiatives, 
because, according to interviewees #4 and #5, only then will be revealed what certain 
projects are really worth to the regions. Other regional parties, such as semi-public 
agencies (e.g. energy companies), can participate in renewal developments, but so far, 
their contributions can only be seen in small-scale pilots initiated by the national 
government. 
Private parties have not experienced great changes in their responsibilities. To 
illustrate, interviewees #2 and #22 from the logistics sector and water construction 
companies argue that they remain fully dependent on the national government, as 
waterway development remains a public task. The interviewees acknowledge that they 
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have good connections within the national government, so they can raise potential 
concerns. 
As the division of responsibilities becomes messier (and is still under 
discussion), approaching waterway renewal within the national programming, planning 
and budgeting scheme with a view to include more functional discussions on the 
waterways, may add to the ambiguity. These discussions may increase transaction costs 
between parties. As interviewee #1 observes, “A mismatch is likely to arise between the 
agendas and rhythms of the different parties”. At the same time, the ‘corners of the 
playing field’ are still undefined: interviewees adhere to different views on what is most 
instrumental. The differing views underline the different operationalisation of utility 
maximisation, which has changed for some through the exploratory studies by 
broadening the goal of renewal. Still, reassuring the dominant path, a group of 
interviewees questions to what extent the PPB-framework is indeed suitable for renewal 
and whether the current organisational arrangements are already sufficient. At the 
moment, these existing institutions are expanding (thus slowly changing) with an 
explicit assignment to inventory potential renewal options that adhere to the national 
PPB-framework, as seen in Rijkswaterstaat’s updated strategic vision on renewal and 
renovation (I&M, 2016). 
To conclude, institutional change is occurring through an extension of the 
dominant organisational arrangements as the outcome of new insights and demands 
(table 3; t=3 in figure 1): in addition to a technical focus (a result of institutional 
reproduction), a functional perspective (institutional change) has emerged that is 
presented by actors as more instrumental with the potential to approach waterway 
renewal in a more comprehensive fashion that includes national and regional actors. 
However, the functional perspective has yet to be explored in practice. 
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Actors’ Views on appropriate Institutions 
For the SCN-lens, we re-constructed institutions that actors find appropriate based on 
content, roles and argumentation. As with the previous section, we looked at current 
institutions and institutions for renewal. 
Initial Conditions: current Institutions 
The availability of the waterway system for the main users (shipping) was put forward 
by interviewees as a central concept in the discourse on waterway renewal A smooth 
operation of the waterway network is therefore regarded appropriate, as reflected in 
concrete performance levels (e.g. navigation locks have to be available 98% of the time) 
that are set by the Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment and with which its 
executive agency, Rijkswaterstaat, has to comply. To illustrate how appropriateness is 
linked to availability and reliability, interviewee #4 refers to former minister Karla Peijs 
(2003-2007) who often emphasised to “maintain what we have got” (in Dutch: “houwen 
voor bouwen”). From this perspective, ageing infrastructure could challenge the 
performance of a waterway network. As infrastructure ages, “Regular maintenance and 
renewal has received more attention.” (interviewee #5) 
This emphasis has clear implications for the management of the network. In the 
exploitation of the waterway system, operator Rijkswaterstaat is the main player as it is 
responsible for the preservation of the availability. According to interviewee 9, “A 
typical operator is rather conservative, it is someone who just wants to have it right. So 
(s)he will always rebuild what was there, as (s)he knows it was of good quality.” In 
other words, a proven system should be maintained. Interviewees from Rijkswaterstaat 
perceive themselves as apolitical and rational experts: “We have become an executive 
agency and as a result [we have been placed] outside of the political domain. (…) We 
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are judged on availability.” (interviewee #19) Rijkswaterstaat translates the objectives 
from the Ministry to specific performance indicators (e.g. ‘service level agreements’) 
and projects resonating new public management thought with ‘value for money’ 
principles. In this respect, Rijkswaterstaat relies on a technical knowledge base, which 
is explained by interviewee #1: 
“[This reliance on technical knowledge encompasses] a feasibility or steerability 
way of thinking of Rijkswaterstaat. You can construct a completely rational system 
[with] performance indicators which you then translate for the different branches 
that you have to manage, but I do not believe in that approach.” 
To summarise, the institutions that actors regard appropriate are risk-averse, 
rationality-driven and somewhat conservative (t=1 in figure 1). In this discourse, 
Rijkswaterstaat plays a central role. 
Within the context of waterway renewal, a culture has emerged in which the 
reasoning goes that if an asset in the waterway network reaches its technical end of life, 
the asset will be replaced in order to safeguard performance. Interviewee #14 explains: 
“When a piece of infrastructure does not function anymore, and so technically is 
written off, well, you’ll have to make an investment to bring the asset back to its 
previous level. The goal is then linked to maintaining the current waterway 
network.” 
As Rijkswaterstaat is predominantly in charge, not only the regional 
stakeholders have limited awareness of the emerging issue of waterway renewal, but 
also the Ministry did initially not perceive renewal as their responsibility. Interviewee 
#12 states that “[Renewal] is a task that is on the agenda of Rijkswaterstaat as the 
responsible operator and maintainer of the waterways.” This perception is reinforced 
because renewal issues are programmed by Rijkswaterstaat within the available budgets 
(figure 2). 
24 
 
Critical Juncture: appropriate Institutions for Renewal 
In view of the number of waterway assets that have to be renewed, interviewees argue 
in favour of expanding the appropriateness of availability and reliability with novel, 
additional concepts. According to interviewee #13, the focus has been too much on 
minor, technical elements (the “bolts and nuts”) and on isolated objects. Instead, 
interviewees would prefer to include wider developments. For instance, interviewee #14 
states:  
“That you can provide additional input based on, what do I see in regard to the 
functionality [of the waterway system], and in regard to the surroundings? What do 
I have to take into account? That [question] is really new.” 
These issues all relate to the current configuration of the network. As a result, a shift in 
content and argumentation can be observed: what is considered appropriate is extended 
to the notion of functionality. With this concept, waterway renewal becomes not just a 
way to maintain the current system in order to safeguard performance, but also an 
opportunity to integrate different developments and to transform the waterway network. 
For instance, interviewee #8 argues that renewal is an opportunity for his region to 
boost the current regional economic situation. 
In this discourse, in which actors stress the possibilities of transforming the 
network, the parties involved are developing new roles. The Ministry of Infrastructure 
& the Environment, for instance, aims to move away from its prescribing role. 
According to interviewee #4, “[Taking the lead] is a position we do not want so much 
anymore. Others just lean back, they think that it is the national government’s turn, they 
will pay, so we do not have to think about renewal.” Instead, the Ministry is looking for 
initiatives shared with regional and local governments to create widely supported 
waterway renewal plans. Still, the Ministry remains a dominant player: “We obviously 
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have a clear role, as we are the party with the large sums of money. (…) Without us 
those major infrastructure projects cannot proceed.” (interviewee #4) Also, the 
Ministry stresses that initiatives need to be sober and effective. Other parties that want 
to participate in renewal projects have to contribute financially, as budgets are limited 
(see figure 2). There must be a clear synergy and, with infrastructure at the eve of 
breaking down, there is a clear time horizon before plans and projects have to be 
finalised.  
On the regional level, the province as the regional government considers itself a 
linking force that can bring together varied interests. Provinces are already familiar with 
this role from having had to deal with many cases involving adjacent land use. 
Provinces argue that they often know their region better than the Ministry or 
Rijkswaterstaat. Interviewees distinguished two types of provincial roles. Some 
provinces take a ‘wait-and-see’ stance which is a more traditional role. Only once the 
national government has launched a plan for their region will provinces lobby to 
incorporate their regional interests in the plan. For them, the Ministry remains a “black 
box” (interviewee #7) which “so to speak still operates from its ivory tower in The 
Hague” (#8). Other provinces are much more pro-active and often have ambitious 
regional development agendas. For instance, interviewee #10 from the province of 
Overijssel states: “We are currently very busily looking to expand the renewal 
challenge to logistic opportunities for Overijssel. (…) How can we achieve more 
economic growth to benefit from [renewal] as much as possible?” Provinces actively 
approach the national government with their ideas, often backed by a regional lobby of 
either businesses or citizens’ initiatives. Since provinces typically also provide 
additional financial resources, synergy with national ambitions can be created. 
Currently, the latter, pro-active stance seems to be favoured by the Ministry. 
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The interviewees have less clear ideas about a possible role for Rijkswaterstaat. 
On the one hand, Rijkswaterstaat is commissioned by the Ministry. As the Ministry 
argues, “We have to keep Rijkswaterstaat focussing on [functional issues], too.” 
(interviewee #5) On the other hand, Rijkswaterstaat has most of the expert knowledge 
on the waterway system, as the agency hand its day-to-day operation. Discussions 
between the Ministry and regional governments can lead to novel configurations of the 
waterway system; Rijkswaterstaat will basically have to comply with the outcomes. 
Interviewee #20, working at Rijkswaterstaat, argues: “Anything is possible, but we are 
responsible for the system.” Put differently, Rijkswaterstaat’s focus on the operation of 
the network can clash with functional negotiations by the Ministry and regional 
governments. Here, a discrepancy can be observed between the established, risk-averse 
discourse of reliability and the emerging discourse that is more opportunity-driven and 
open to new initiatives.  
In this emerging stream, a relatively different belief system with regard to 
appropriateness has developed, in which actors emphasise the larger picture to be taken 
into account. From this perspective, renewal is not just a technical issue, but also relates 
to the waterway system (what do we want to do with the waterway system and the 
surrounding region? – an object-related question) and what parties aim for (who to 
involve? – a more process-related question). As interviewee #6 observes, “Other parties 
had the comfortable position kicking against [complaining about] Rijkswaterstaat and 
the Ministry, but that does not hold anymore.” Nevertheless, the national government 
remains powerful as it has the largest budget (Ministry) and the expertise 
(Rijkswaterstaat). To conclude, institutional change is slowly occurring and the concept 
of appropriateness is being expanded by actors, by incorporating a more functional, 
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relational understanding of waterway renewal in an addition to the operator-dominated 
perspective (table 3; t=3 in figure 1). 
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
As waterway networks in the western world are increasingly ageing, waterway renewal 
becomes a change imperative for redeveloping and transforming these networks to meet 
current and future demands. For waterway planning and management, renewal brings 
up strategic considerations of what we want to do with these mature networks which 
typically last fifty to one hundred years. The aim of our article was to understand from 
two institutional lenses how actors perceive the change imperative of anticipating 
waterway renewal and which institutional change actors find feasible. In this article, 
institutions are not seen as stable entities, although they are often depicted as such, but 
rather as dynamic entities that actors can re-create. The literature on path dependency 
has demonstrated how anticipating change can be strongly conditioned by established 
institutional paths. In these paths, both institutional reproduction and institutional 
change occurs. For the successful anticipation of waterway renewal, actors need to 
navigate between reproduction and change – i.e. exploit current practices and explore 
new ones (March, 1991). 
This article has developed a framework that enables us to identify these two 
mechanisms as approached from new institutional economics and socio-constructionist 
institutionalism. Both approaches presume different motivations why either institutional 
reproduction or institutional change is chosen. In new institutional economics, actors are 
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driven by a logic of instrumentality; in the socio-constructionist institutionalism, actors 
adhere to a logic of appropriateness (table 2). Actors’ motivations were explored from 
both institutional angles in a case study of the Dutch national inland waterway network. 
Our results demonstrate that newly established transactions consider the longer term and 
wider regional developments leading to different trade-offs; new interpretations include 
not only technical aspects of the ageing infrastructure but also look into its functionality 
(table 3). Still, in line with previous research (Banister et al., 2011; Farrelly & Brown, 
2011), existing institutions condition to a great extent how waterway renewal is 
approached, therefore indicating that the balance between institutional reproduction and 
change is currently tipping to the former. Accordingly, actors perceive discarding 
existing institutions as not instrumental and inappropriate, but rather opt for modifying 
and complementing them with new institutions in order to make them “work”. New 
institutions are thus emerging, which Mahoney and Thelen (2009) refer to as 
institutional layering.  
The implications for planning practice are a broadening up of approaches to 
waterway renewal (figure 3). The analysis from both theoretical lenses shows that, in 
addition to the dominant path (A in figure 3), a new path is emerging (B). 
Consequently, we have observed a shift from approaching renewal as a technical and 
financial issue (focused on isolated objects) towards an issue that requires functional-
relational discussions related to wider system implications. In our case, these 
discussions aim to enhance the coherence between national infrastructure investments 
and regional spatial developments, for instance through exploring potential synergies. 
Thus, the technical-hierarchical way of working was seen by interviewees as 
inappropriate, since renewal requires larger-scale discussions about the future of the 
waterway network. Likewise, with this broader scope in mind, the instrumentality of the 
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existing institutions was considered inadequate. Interviewees argued that, depending on 
the size of waterway assets, either a more technical or a more functional approach can 
be followed. A reconsideration by actors of the logics of instrumentality and 
appropriateness thus leads to a diversification of approaches to renewal. For planning 
theory and practice, these findings demonstrate that actors are deliberately aiming at 
institutional change in order to tailor institutions to a new situation. As existing 
institutions are mainly complemented by new ones, institutional change in our highly 
institutionalised case study demonstrates to be an incremental process. Given the 
explorative nature of our empirical work, future research can further ground these 
findings. 
 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
 
More generally, our research indicates that institutional change is accelerated 
once actors deliberately put the dominant logics of instrumentality and appropriateness 
under pressure. This finding raises the question whether planners have the capacity to 
enhance mechanisms for institutional change. Since institutions have a tendency to 
reinforce themselves, questioning established institutions does not come easy. Our case 
study of the institutional setting in the Dutch inland waterway network was no different 
in that respect. These questions – and proposed modifications to institutions – often stay 
within the realm of exploratory studies and are yet to be raised in actual practice. Our 
findings reconfirm the vested interests in both the waterway infrastructure and the 
institutions in which the national government plays a leading role (e.g. in terms of right 
of ownership and being the main financial contributor). Both institutional lenses offered 
different insights for agents pursuing institutional change. From a new institutional 
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economics perspective, actors re-created institutions once they observed promising co-
financing arrangements between different levels of governments. From a socio-
constructionist institutionalism perspective, established institutions were perceived as 
inadequate, because their focus was considered too “engineeristic”. Hence, new 
institutions that stress functional-relational aspects were developed. Together, both 
institutional lenses offer clues how more integrative forms of waterway planning can be 
achieved. From both lenses, institutional change can be fostered through the 
incorporation of multiple stakeholders, either through co-financing arrangements 
(perceived as more efficient than “siloed” policy processes) or through functional-
relational discussions in which a wider array of stakeholders participates (perceived as 
more appropriate than a mono-functional, engineering focus). Cases of infrastructure 
renewal are likely to appear more structurally in the future, with questions about 
institutional change becoming more apparent. Our case study is an initial examination, 
so future research can further substantiate the role of change agents in effectuating 
institutional change. 
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Table 1: A framework to research institutions from two lenses. 
 New institutional 
economics (NIE) 
Socio-constructionist 
institutionalism (SCN) 
Source 
Key focus Institutions are 
organisational structures 
that smoothen human 
interactions in order to 
achieve specific ends 
 
Institutions are cultural 
signifiers that shape 
human interaction, visible 
in shared attitudes, norms 
and values 
 
Hall & 
Taylor, 
1996; 
Inderberg, 
2011 
Understanding 
institutional 
change in 
practice 
Institutions are assessed 
by individuals against a 
logic of instrumentality 
Institutions are assessed 
by individuals against a 
logic of social 
appropriateness 
March & 
Olsen, 
1989; 
Williamson, 
1998 
Research 
approach 
Analysis of actors’ 
considerations in their 
search for efficient 
organisational structures 
by assessing the different 
transaction costs 
Analysis of actors’ views 
on appropriate cultural 
signifiers through 
interpretative research 
rooted in a socio-
constructionist worldview 
Hall & 
Taylor, 
1996; 
González & 
Healey, 
2005 
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Table 2. The two institutional strands offer different explanations for institutional 
reproduction and change (adapted from Mahoney, 2000). 
 Mechanism of reproduction Mechanism of change 
NIE: Logic of 
instrumentality 
Rational cost-benefit trade-off 
(lowering transaction costs) 
New insights leading to new 
trade-off: challenging the 
instrumentality 
SCN: Logic of 
appropriateness 
Reconfirming appropriateness; 
‘compliance to the norm’ 
Changes in the values of 
actors: challenging the 
appropriateness 
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Table 3. Institutional reproduction and change in the Dutch inland waterway network. 
 Mechanism of reproduction Mechanism of change 
NIE: Logic of 
instrumentality 
Advancement of a technical 
approach, financed by regular 
maintenance budgets; Ministry 
and Rijkswaterstaat are leading 
actors 
 Transactions oriented 
towards the here and 
now 
Rise of a new functional and 
relational approach: using the 
PPB-framework for co-
financing with national and 
regional parties 
 “Broader” transactions 
oriented towards the 
long term and the 
bigger picture 
SCN: Logic of 
appropriateness 
Continuation of an operator-
dominated (i.e. 
Rijkswaterstaat) culture that 
takes a technical perspective on 
waterway renewal 
 Actors espousing the 
dominant discourse 
Emergence of a more strategic, 
functional discourse that 
questions current waterway 
configurations with wide 
stakeholder involvement 
 Actors questioning the 
dominant discourse 
with novel concepts 
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Figure 1. Path dependencies (adapted from Mahoney, 2000; see also Matthews, 2013). 
Figure 2. Renewal as perceived by the Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment 
(adapted from I&M, 2016). 
Figure 3. Institutional layering in the Dutch inland waterway system for waterway 
renewal. 
